We study sources and consequences of uctuations in the U.S. housing market. Slow technological progress in the housing sector explains the upward trend in real housing prices of the last 40 years. Over the business cycle, housing demand and housing technology shocks explain one-quarter each of the volatility of housing investment and housing prices. Monetary factors explain less than 20 percent, but have played a bigger role in the housing cycle at the turn of the century. We show that the housing market spillovers are non-negligible, concentrated on consumption rather than business investment, and have become more important over time. KEYWORDS: Housing, Wealth Effects, Bayesian Estimation, Two-sector Models. JEL CODES: E32, E44, E47, R21, R31
The experience of the U.S. housing market at the beginning of the 21st century (fast growth in housing prices and residential investment initially, and a decline thereafter) has led many to raise the specter that the developments in the housing sector are not just a passive re ection of macroeconomic activity but might themselves be one of the driving forces of business cycles. To understand whether such concerns are justi ed, it is crucial to answer two questions: .1/ What is the nature of the shocks hitting the housing market? .2/ How big are the spillovers from the housing market to the wider economy?
In this paper, we address these questions using a quantitative approach. We develop and estimate, using Bayesian methods, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy that explicitly models the price and the quantity side of the housing market. Our goal is twofold. First, we want to study the combination of shocks and frictions that can explain the dynamics of residential investment and housing prices in the data. Second, to the extent that the model can reproduce key features of the data, we want to measure the spillovers from the housing market to the wider economy. Our starting point is a variant of many dynamic equilibrium models with a neoclassical core and nominal and real rigidities that have become popular in monetary policy analysis (see Lawrence J. Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum and Charles L. Evans, 2005, and Frank Smets and Raf Wouters, 2007) . There are at least two reasons why we regard these models (that do not consider housing explicitly) as our starting point. First, because of goal is to study the interactions between housing and the broader economy, it is natural to have as a benchmark Iacoviello: Boston College, Department of Economics, 140 Commonwealth Ave, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, USA (email:iacoviel@bc.edu). Neri: Banca d'Italia, Research Department, Via Nazionale 91, 00184 Roma, Italy (email: stefano.neri@bancaditalia.it). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily re ect the views of the Banca d'Italia. We thank two anonymous referees, Richard Arnott, Zvi Eckstein, Jesus FernandezVillaverde, Jonas Fisher, Jordi Galí, Peter Ireland, Michel Juillard, Bob King, Gabriel Lee, Lisa Lynch, Caterina Mendicino, Tommaso Monacelli, John Muellbauer, Fabio Schiantarelli, Livio Stracca, Karl Walentin and conference and seminar participants for comments and suggestions. 1 a model that ts the U.S. data well on the one hand, 1 and that encompasses most of the views on the sources and propagation mechanism of business cycles on the other. Second, because our housing model (aside from minor differences) encompasses the core of these models as a special case, it can facilitate communication both to policymakers and between researchers.
Our model captures two main features of housing. On the supply side, we add sectoral heterogeneity, as in Morris A. Davis and Jonathan Heathcote (2005) : the non-housing sector produces consumption and business investment using capital and labor; the housing sector produces new homes using capital, labor and land. On the demand side, housing and consumption enter households' utility and housing can be used as collateral for loans, as in Matteo Iacoviello (2005) . Since housing and consumption goods are produced using different technologies, the model generates endogenous dynamics both in residential vis-à-vis business investment and in the price of housing. At the same time, uctuations in house prices affect the borrowing capacity of a fraction of households, on the one hand, and the relative pro tability of producing new homes, on the other: these mechanisms generate feedback effects for the expenditure of households and rms. 2 We estimate the model using quarterly data over the period 1965:I-2006:IV. The dynamics of the model are driven by productivity, nominal and preference shocks. Our estimated model explains well several features of the data: it can explain both the cyclical properties and the longrun behavior of housing and non-housing variables. It can also match the observation that both housing prices and housing investment are strongly procyclical, volatile, and very sensitive to monetary shocks. In terms of the two questions we posed at the beginning, we conclude that:
Over long horizons, the model can explain qualitatively and quantitatively the trends in real housing prices and investment of the last four decades. The increase in real housing prices is the consequence of slower technological progress in the housing sector and of the presence of land (a xed factor) in the production function for new homes. Over the business cycle instead, three main factors drive the housing market. Housing demand and housing supply shocks explain roughly one-quarter each of the cyclical volatility of housing investment and housing prices. Monetary factors explain between 15 and 20 percent. Looking at the historical decomposition, we nd that the housing cycles of the late 1970s/early 1980s had a relatively strong technological component, whereas the housing cycles at the turn of the 21st century were driven in non-negligible part by monetary factors.
There is not a unique way of quantifying housing market spillovers since, obviously, both housing prices and quantities are endogenous variables in our model. We focus on one aspect of the spillovers, that is, the relationship between housing wealth and non-housing consumption. We nd that collateral effects on household borrowing amplify the response of non-housing consumption to given changes in fundamentals, thus altering the propagation mechanism: in Section IV, we nd that our estimated collateral effects increase the reduced-form elasticity of consumption to housing wealth by 2.5 percentage points, from about 0.11 to 0.135. In addition, when we estimate the model over two subsamples, before and after the 1980s, we show that housing collateral effects have contributed to 6 percent of the variance in consumption growth in the early period, and to 12 percent in the late period. Hence, the average spillovers from the housing market to the rest of the economy have become more important over time. 3 Our analysis combines four main elements: .1/ a multi-sector structure with housing and nonhousing goods; .2/ nominal rigidities; .3/ nancing frictions in the household sector and .4/ a rich set of shocks, which are essential to take the model to the data. 4 Jeremy Greenwood and Zvi Hercowitz (1991) , Jess Benhabib, Richard Rogerson, and Randall Wright (1991) , Yongsung Chang (2000) , Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Jonas D. M. Fisher (2007) are examples of calibrated models dealing with .1/ ; but they consider technology shocks only. Davis and Heathcote (2005) is perhaps our closest antecedent, since their multi-sector structure endogenizes both housing prices and quantities in an equilibrium framework. They use a model with intermediate goods in which construction, manufacturing and services are used to produce consumption, business investment, and structures. Structures are then combined with land to produce homes. On the supply side, our setup shares some features with theirs. However, since our goal is to take the model to the data, we allow additional real and nominal frictions and a larger set of shocks. There are three advantages in doing so. First, we do not need to commit to a particular view of sources of business cycle uctuations: indeed our results show that several shocks are needed to explain the patterns of comovement which are observed in the data. Second, we can analyze the monetary transmission mechanism both to housing prices and housing investment. Third, we can do a better job at explaining the interactions between housing and macroeconomy: for instance, Davis and Heathcote (2005) require sectoral technology shocks to explain the high volatility of housing investment; however, these shocks also yield the counterfactual prediction that housing prices and housing investment are negatively correlated. 5
I. The Model
The model features two sectors, heterogeneity in households' discount factors and collateral constraints tied to housing values. On the demand side, there are two types of households: patient (lenders) and impatient (borrowers). Patient households work, consume and accumulate housing: they own the productive capital of the economy, and supply funds to rms on the one 3 In our variance decomposition, we also show that the direct effect on the economy of housing-speci c shocks is small. A large fraction of what we identify as housing spillovers thus re ects the role of housing in propagating other shocks, rather than shocks originating in the housing market itself. 4 Several papers have studied the role of housing collateral in models with incomplete markets and nancing frictions by combining elements of .1/ and . between two production sectors and between consumption of nondurables and services, investment in durables and in residences. Hafedh Bouakez, Emanuela Cardia and Francisco Ruge-Murcia (forthcoming) estimate a model with heterogenous production sectors that differ in price stickiness, capital adjustment costs and production technology. None of these papers deal explicitly with housing prices and housing investment, which are the main focus of our analysis.
hand, and to impatient households on the other. Impatient households work, consume and accumulate housing: because of their high impatience, they accumulate only the required net worth to nance the down payment on their home and are up against their housing collateral constraint in equilibrium. On the supply side, the non-housing sector combines capital and labor to produce consumption and business capital for both sectors. The housing sector produces new homes combining business capital with labor and land.
A. Households.
There is a continuum of measure 1 of agents in each of the two groups (patient and impatient). The economic size of each group is measured by its wage share, which is assumed to be constant through a unit elasticity of substitution production function. Within each group, a representative household maximizes: 6
(1)
Variables without (with) a prime refer to patient (impatient) households. c, h; n c ; n h are consumption, housing, hours in the consumption sector and hours in the housing sector. The discount factors are and 0 ( 0 < ). The terms z t and t capture shocks to intertemporal preferences and to labor supply. We label movements in j t as housing preference shocks. There are at least two possible interpretations of this shock. One interpretation is that the shock captures, in a reduced form way, cyclical variations in the availability of resources needed to purchase housing relative to other goods or other social and institutional changes that shift preferences towards housing. Another interpretation is that uctuations in j t could proxy for random changes in the factor mix required to produce home services from a given housing stock. 7 The shocks follow:
where u z;t , u ;t and u j;t are i.i.d. processes with variances 2 z ; 2 and 2 j . Above, " measures habits in consumption, 8 and G C is the growth rate of consumption in the balanced growth path.
that the marginal utilities of consumption are 1=c and 1=c 0 in the steady state.
The log-log speci cation of preferences for consumption and housing reconciles the trend in the relative housing prices and the stable nominal share of expenditures on household investment goods, as in Davis and Heathcote (2005) and Fisher (2007) . The speci cation of the disutility of labor ( ; 0) follows Michael Horvath (2000) and allows for less than perfect labor mobility across sectors. If and 0 equal zero, hours in the two sectors are perfect substitutes. Positive values of and 0 (as Horvath found) allow for some degree of sector speci city and imply that relative hours respond less to sectoral wage differentials.
Patient households accumulate capital and houses and make loans to impatient households. They rent capital to rms, choose the capital utilization rate and sell the remaining undepreciated capital; in addition, there is joint production of consumption and business investment goods. Patient households maximize their utility subject to:
Patient agents choose consumption c t ; capital in the consumption sector k c;t , capital k h;t and intermediate inputs k b;t (priced at p b;t ) in the housing sector, housing h t (priced at q t ); land l t (priced at p l;t ), hours n c;t and n h;t ; capital utilization rates z c;t and z h;t , and borrowing b t (loans if b t is negative) to maximize utility subject to .3/. The term A k;t captures investment-speci c technology shocks, thus representing the marginal cost (in terms of consumption) of producing capital used in the non-housing sector. 9 Loans are set in nominal terms and yield a riskless nominal return of R t . Real wages are denoted by w c;t and w h;t ; real rental rates by R c;t and R h;t , depreciation rates by kc and kh . The terms X wc;t and X wh;t denote the markup (due to monopolistic competition in the labor market) between the wage paid by the wholesale rm and the wage paid to the households, which accrues to the labor unions (we discuss below the details of nominal rigidities in the labor market). Finally, t D P t =P t 1 is the money in ation rate in the consumption sector, Div t are lump-sum pro ts from nal good rms and from labor unions, t denotes convex adjustment costs for capital, z is the capital utilization rate that transforms physical capital k into effective capital zk and a . / is the convex cost of setting the capital utilization rate to z. The equations for t , a . / and Div t are in Appendix B. 10 9 We assume that investment shocks hit only the capital used in the production of consumption goods, k c , since investment-speci c technological progress mostly refers to information technology (IT) and construction is a non-ITintensive industry. 10 We do not allow for a convex adjustment cost of housing demand (in preliminary estimation attempts, we found that the parameter measuring this cost was driven to its lower bound of zero). Home purchases are subject to non-convex adjustment costs (typically, some xed expenses and an agent fee that is proportional to the value of the house), which cannot be dealt with easily in our model. It is not clear whether these non-convex costs bear important implications for aggregate residential investment. For instance, Julia K. Thomas (2002) nds that infrequent microeconomic adjustment Impatient households do not accumulate capital and do not own nished good rms or land (their dividends come only from labor unions). In addition, their maximum borrowing b 0 t is given by the expected present value of their home times the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio m: 11 
The assumption 0 < implies that for small shocks the constraint .5/ holds with equality near the steady state. When 0 is lower than , impatient agents decumulate wealth quickly enough to some lower bound and, for small shocks, the lower bound is binding. 12 Patient agents own and accumulate all the capital. Impatient agents only accumulate housing and borrow the maximum possible amount against it. Along the equilibrium path, uctuations in housing values affect through .5/ borrowing and spending capacity of constrained households: the effect is larger the larger m; since m measures, ceteris paribus, the liquidity of housing wealth.
B. Technology.
To introduce price rigidity in the consumption sector, we differentiate between competitive exible price/wholesale rms that produce wholesale consumption goods and housing using two technologies, and a nal good rm (described below) at the plant level has negligible implications for the behavior of aggregate investment; in addition, a sizable fraction (25 percent) of residential investment in the National Income and Product Accounts consists of home improvements, where transaction costs are less likely to apply.
11 An analogous constraint might apply to patient households too, but would not bind in equilibrium. 12 The extent to which the borrowing constraint holds with equality in equilibrium mostly depends on the difference between the discount factors of the two groups and on the variance of the shocks that hit the economy. We have solved simpli ed, non-linear versions of two-agent models with housing and capital accumulation in the presence of aggregate risk that allow for the borrowing constraint to bind only occasionally. For discount rate differentials of the magnitude assumed here, impatient agents are always arbitrarily close to the borrowing constraint (details are available upon request). For this reason, we solve the model linearizing the equilibrium conditions of the model around a steady state with a binding borrowing constraint.
In .6/, the non-housing sector produces output with labor and capital. In .7/, new homes are produced with labor, capital, land and the intermediate input k b . The terms A c;t and A h;t measure productivity in the non-housing and housing sector, respectively.
As shown by .6/ and .7/, we let hours of the two households enter the two production functions in a Cobb-Douglas fashion. This assumption implies complementarity across the labor skills of the two groups and allows obtaining closed-form solutions for the steady state of the model. With this formulation, the parameter measures the labor income share of unconstrained households. 13 C. Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy.
We allow for price rigidities in the consumption sector and for wage rigidities in both sectors. We rule out price rigidities in the housing market: according to Robert Barsky, Christopher House and Miles S. Kimball (2007) there are several reasons why housing might have exible prices. First, housing is relatively expensive on a per-unit basis; therefore, if menu costs have important xed components, there is a large incentive to negotiate on the price of this good. Second, most homes are priced for the rst time when they are sold.
We introduce sticky prices in the consumption sector by assuming monopolistic competition at the "retail" level and implicit costs of adjusting nominal prices following Calvo-style contracts. Retailers buy wholesale goods Y t from wholesale rms at the price P w t in a competitive market, differentiate the goods at no cost, and sell them at a markup X t D P t =P w t over the marginal cost. The CES aggregates of these goods are converted back into homogeneous consumption and investment goods by households. Each period, a fraction 1 of retailers set prices optimally, while a fraction cannot do so, and index prices to the previous period in ation rate with an elasticity equal to . These assumptions deliver the following consumption-sector Phillips curve:
. cost shocks u p;t are allowed to affect in ation independently from changes in the markup. These shocks have zero mean and variance 2 p . We model wage setting in a way that is analogous to price setting. Patient and impatient households supply homogeneous labor services to unions. The unions differentiate labor services as in Smets and Wouters (2007) , set wages subject to a Calvo scheme and offer labor services to wholesale labor packers who reassemble these services into the homogeneous labor composites n c ; n h ; n 0 c ; n 0 h . 14 Wholesale rms hire labor from these packers. Under Calvo pricing with partial indexation to past in ation, the pricing rules set by the union imply four wage Phillips curves that are isomorphic to the price Phillips curve. These equations are in Appendix B. 13 We have experimented with an alternative setup in which hours of the groups are perfect substitutes in production, with similar results. The alternative formulation is analytically less tractable, since it implies that hours worked by one group will affect total wage income received by the other group, thus creating a complex interplay between borrowing constraints and labor supply decisions of both groups.
14 We assume that there are four unions, one for each sector/household pair. While unions in each sector choose slightly different wage rates, re ecting the different consumption pro les of the two household types, we assume that the probability of changing wages is common to both patient and impatient households. 
D. Equilibrium.
The goods market produces consumption, business investment and intermediate inputs. The housing market produces new homes I H t . The equilibrium conditions are:
together with the loan market equilibrium condition. Above,
t is the aggregate stock of housing, and I K c;t D k c;t .1 kc / k c;t 1 and I K h;t D k h;t .1 kh / k h;t 1 are the two components of business investment. Total land is xed and normalized to one.
E. Trends and Balanced Growth.
We allow for heterogeneous trends in productivity in the consumption, nonresidential and housing sector. These processes follow:
where the innovations u C;t ; u H;t ; u K ;t are serially uncorrelated with zero mean and standard deviations AC ; AH ; AK ; and the terms AC ; AH ; AK denote the net growth rates of tech-15 Our de nition of GDP sums consumption and investment by their steady-state nominal shares. That is, G D P t D C t C I K t C q I H t ; where q denotes real housing prices along the balanced growth path (following Davis and Heathcote (2005) , our GDP de nition uses steady-state house prices, so that short-run changes in real house prices do not affect GDP growth). We exclude imputed rents from our de nition of GDP because our model implies a tight mapping between house prices and rents at business cycle frequency. Including rents in the model de nition of GDP would be too close to including house prices themselves in the Taylor rule and would create a mechanical link between house prices and consumption of housing services.
nology in each sector. Since preferences and production functions have a Cobb-Douglas form, a balanced growth path exists, along which the growth rates of the real variables are: 16
AH . (15) As shown above, the trend growth rates of I K h;t ; I K c;t =A k;t and q t I H t are all equal to G C ; the trend growth rate of real consumption. Second, business investment grows faster than consumption, as long as AK > 0. Third, the trend growth rate in real house prices offsets differences in the productivity growth between the consumption and the housing sector. These differences are due to the heterogeneous rates of technological progress in the two sectors and to the presence of land in the production function for new homes.
II. Parameter Estimates

A. Methods and Data.
We linearize the equations describing the equilibrium around the balanced growth path. For given parameters, the solution takes the form of a state-space model that is used to compute the likelihood function. Our estimation strategy follows a Bayesian approach: we transform the data into a form suitable for computing the likelihood function; we choose prior distributions for the parameters; and we estimate their posterior distribution using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. 17 We use ten observables: real consumption, 18 real residential investment, real business investment, real house prices, 19 nominal interest rates, in ation, hours and wage in ation in 16 Business capital includes two components -capital in the consumption sector k c and in the construction sector k h -that grow at different rates (in real terms) along the balanced growth path. The data provide only a chain-weighted series for the aggregate of these two series, since sectoral data on capital held by the construction sector are available only at annual frequency and are not reported in NIPA. Since capital held by the construction sector is a small fraction of non-residential capital (around 5 percent), total investment is assumed to grow at the same rate as the investment in the consumption-good sector.
17 See Sungbae An and Frank Schorfheide (2007) for a description of the methodology. Appendix C reports details on the estimation strategy and tests of convergence for the stability of the estimated parameters. 18 Consumption, investment and hours are in per capita terms, in ation and the interest rate are expressed on a quarterly basis. We use total chain-weighted consumption, since our goal is to assess the implications of housing for a broad measure of consumption, and because chained aggregates do not suffer the base-year problem discussed in Karl Whelan (2003) . NIPA data do not provide a chained series for consumption excluding housing services and durables, which would correspond to our theoretical de nition of consumption. 19 All available house price indices suffer from some problems (see Jordan Rappaport, 2007 , for a survey). Our baseline measure is the Census Bureau constant quality index for the price of new houses sold. An alternative series is the OFHEO Conventional Mortgage House Price Index, which starts in 1970. At low frequencies, the OFHEO series moves together the consumption sector, hours and wage in ation in the housing sector. We estimate the model from 1965:I to 2006:IV. In Section IV.B, we estimate the model over two subperiods :I to 1982 :IV and 1989 :I to 2006 in order to investigate the stability of the estimated parameters. Figure 1 plots the series (described in Appendix A). Real house prices have increased in the sample period by about 1.7 percent per year. Business investment has grown faster than consumption, which has in turn grown faster than residential investment. We keep the trend and remove the level information from the series that we use in estimation. We calibrate depreciation rates, capital shares in the production functions and weights in the utility functions in order to match consumption, investment and wealth to output ratios. We x the discount factor in order to match the real interest rate and demean in ation and the nominal interest rate. In a similar vein, we do not use information on steady-state hours to calibrate the labor supply parameters, since in any multi-sector model the link between value added of the sector, on the one hand, and available measures of total hours worked in the same sector, on the other, is somewhat tenuous. In addition, there are reasons to believe that self-employment in construction varies over the cycle. For this reason, we allow for measurement error in total hours in this sector. 20 In equilibrium the transformed variables
q all remain stationary. In addition total hours in the two sectors N c;t and N h;t remain stationary, as do in ation t and the nominal interest rate R t . The model predicts that real wages in the two sectors should grow at the same rate as consumption along the balanced growth path. Available industry wage data (such as those provided by the BLS Current Employment Statistics) show a puzzling divergence between real hourly wages and real consumption over the sample in question, with the latter rising twice as fast as the former between . Daniel Sullivan (1997 argues that the BLS measures of sectoral wages suffer from potential measurement error. For these two reasons, we use demeaned nominal wage in ation in the estimation and allow for measurement error. 21 B. Calibrated Parameters.
We calibrate the discount factors ; 0 , the weight on housing in the utility function j, the technology parameters c ; h ; l ; b ; h ; kc ; kh ; the steady-state gross price and wage markups X; X wc , X wh ; the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio m and the persistence of the in ation objective shock with the Census series (the correlation between their real, year-on-year growth rates is 0.70). In the 1970-2006 period, the OFHEO series has a stronger upward trend: our Census series grows in real terms by an average of 1.7 percent per year, the OFHEO series by 2.4 percent. Being based on repeat sales, the OFHEO series is perhaps a better measure of house price appreciation at short-run frequencies; however, some have argued that the OFHEO series is biased upward (around 0.5 percent per year) because homes that change hands more frequently have greater price appreciation (see Joshua Gallin, 2008) . In addition, repeat sales indexes do a poor job at controlling for home improvements, which are largely procyclical, thus making the upward bias larger in times when incomes and house prices are rising (see Rappaport, 2007) . 20 Available measures of hours and employment in construction are based on the Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey. They classify between .1/ residential construction workers, .2/ nonresidential construction workers and .3/ trade contractors, without distinguishing whether trade contractors work in the residential or nonresidential sector. Besides this, the CES survey does not include self-employed and unpaid family workers, who account for about one in three jobs in the construction sector itself, and for much less elsewhere. 21 Appendix D discusses our results with alternative assumptions regarding measurement error.
s . We x these parameters because they are either notoriously dif cult to estimate (in the case of the markups) or because they are better identi ed using other information (in the case of the factor shares and the discount factors). Table 2 displays the steady-state ratios of the model. 22 We set D 0:9925; implying a steady-state annual real interest rate of 3 percent. We x the 22 Four of the parameters that we estimate (the three trend growth parameters -AK , AC and AH -and the income share of patient agents ) slightly affect the steady-state ratios. The numbers in Table 2 are based both on the calibrated parameters and on the mean estimates reported in Tables 3 and 4. discount factor of the impatient households 0 at 0:97. This value has a limited effect on the dynamics but guarantees an impatience motive for impatient households large enough that they are arbitrarily close to the borrowing limit, so that the linearization around a steady-state with binding borrowing limit is accurate (see the discussion in Iacoviello, 2005) . We x X D 1:15; implying a steady-state markup of 15 percent in the consumption-good sector. Similarly, we set X wc D X wh D 1:15: We x the correlation of the in ation objective shock s . This parameter was hard to pin down in initial estimation attempts; a value of s D 0:975 implies an annual autocorrelation of trend in ation around 0:9, a reasonable value.
The depreciation rates for housing, capital in the consumption sector and capital in the housing sector are set equal, respectively, to h D 0:01; kc D 0:025 and kh D 0:03: The rst number (together with j; the weight on housing in the utility function) pins down the ratio of residential investment to total output at around 6 percent, as in the data. The other numbers -together with the capital shares in production -imply a ratio of non-residential investment to GDP around 27 percent. We pick a slightly higher value for the depreciation rate of construction capital on the basis of BLS data on service lives of various capital inputs, which indicate that construction machinery (the data counterpart to k h ) has a lower service life than other types of nonresidential equipment (the counterpart to k c ).
For the capital share in the goods production function, we choose c D 0:35. In the housing production function, we choose a capital share of h D 0:10 and a land share of l D 0:10; following Davis and Heathcote (2005) . Together with the other estimated parameters, the chosen land share implies that the value of residential land is about 50 percent of annual GDP. This happens because the price of land capitalizes future housing production opportunities. 23 We set the intermediate goods share at b D 0:10. Input-output tables indicate a share of material costs for most sectors of around 50 percent, which suggests a calibration for b as high as 0:50. We choose to be conservative because our value for b is only meant to capture the extent to which sticky-price intermediate inputs are used in housing production. The weight on housing in the utility function is set at j D 0:12. Together with the technology parameters, these choices imply a ratio of business capital to annual GDP of around 2:1 and a ratio of housing wealth to GDP around 1:35.
Next, we set the LTV ratio m. This parameter is dif cult to estimate without data on debt and housing holdings of credit-constrained households. Our calibration is meant to measure the typical LTV ratio for homebuyers who are likely to be credit constrained and borrow the maximum possible against their home. Between 1973 and 2006, the average LTV ratio was 0:76. 24 Yet "impatient" households might want to borrow more as a fraction of their home. In 2004, for instance, 27 percent of new homebuyers took LTV ratios in excess of 80 percent, with an average ratio (conditional on borrowing more than 80 percent) of 0:94. We choose to be conservative and set m D 0:85. It is conceivable that the assumption of a constant value for m 23 Simple algebra shows that the steady-state value of land relative to residential investment equals
In practice, ownership of land entitles the household to the present discounted value of future income from renting land to housing production rms, which is proportional to l . For l D 0:10; D 0:9925; q I H=G D P D 0:06 and our median estimate of G C D 1:0047; this yields the value reported in the main text. 24 The data are from the Finance Board's Monthly Survey of Rates and Terms on Conventional Single-Family Nonfarm Mortgage Loans (summary table 19 ).
over a 40-year period might be too strong, in light of the observation that the mortgage market has become more liberalized over time. We take these considerations into account when we estimate our model across subsamples, calibrating m differently across subperiods.
C. Prior Distributions.
Our priors are in Tables 3 and 4 . Overall, they are consistent with previous studies. We use inverse gamma priors for the standard errors of the shocks. For the persistence, we choose a beta-distribution with a prior mean of 0.8 and standard deviation of 0.1. We set the prior mean of the habit parameters in consumption (" and " 0 ) at 0.5. For the monetary policy rule, we base our priors on a Taylor rule responding gradually to in ation only, so that the prior means of r R ; r and r Y are, respectively, 0.75, 1.5 and 0. We set a prior on the capital adjustment costs of around 10: 25 We choose a loose beta prior for the utilization parameter ( ) between zero (capacity utilization can be varied at no cost) and one (capacity utilization never changes). For the disutility of working, we center the elasticity of the hours aggregator at 2 (the prior mean for and 0 is 0.5). We select values for and 0 ; the parameters describing the inverse elasticity of substitution across hours in the two sectors, of around 1; as estimated by Horvath (2000) . We select the prior mean of the Calvo price and wage parameter ; wc and wh at 0:667, with a standard deviation of 0:05, values that are close to the estimates of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) . The priors for the indexation parameters ; wc and wh are loosely centered around 0:5, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) .
We set the prior mean for the labor income share of unconstrained agents to be 0:65, with a standard error of 0:05. The mean is in the range of comparable estimates in the literature: for instance, using the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances, Tullio Jappelli (1990) estimates 20 percent of the population to be liquidity constrained; Iacoviello (2005) , using a limited information approach, estimates a wage share of collateral-constrained agents of 36 percent.
D. Posterior Distributions.
Tables 3 and 4 report the posterior mean, median and 95 probability intervals for the structural parameters, together with the mean and standard deviation of the prior distributions. In addition to the structural parameters, we estimate the standard deviation of the measurement error for hours and wage in ation in the housing sector. 26 25 Given our adjustment cost speci cation (see Appendix B), the implied elasticity of investment to its shadow value is 1= . / : Our prior implies an elasticity of investment to its shadow price of around 4.
26 Draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained using the random walk version of the Metropolis algorithm. Tables and gures are based on a sample of 500,000 draws. The jump distribution was chosen to be the normal one with covariance matrix equal to the Hessian of the posterior density evaluated at the maximum. The scale factor was chosen in order to deliver an acceptance rate around 25 percent. Convergence was assessed by comparing the moments computed by splitting the draws of the Metropolis into two halves. See Appendix C for more details. We nd a faster rate of technological progress in business investment, followed by consumption and by the housing sector. In the next section, we discuss the implications of these ndings for the long-run properties of consumption, housing investment and real house prices.
One key parameter relates to the labor income share of credit-constrained agents. Our estimate of is 0:79 . This number implies a share of labor income accruing to credit-constrained agents of 21 percent. This value is lower than our prior mean. However, as we document below, this value is large enough to generate a positive elasticity of consumption to house prices after a housing demand shock (see next section). 27 Both agents exhibit a moderate degree of habit formation in consumption and relatively little preference for mobility across sectors, as shown by the positive values of and 0 . The degree of habits in consumption is larger for the impatient households than for patient ones (" 0 D 0:58 and " D 0:32). One explanation may be that since impatient households do not hold capital and 27 Impatient households have a higher marginal propensity to consume (because of their low discount factor) but a low average propensity to consume (because of the high steady state debt payments). Because of this, despite their 21 percent wage share, they account for 17 percent of total consumption, and own 14 percent of the total housing stock. they cannot smooth consumption through saving, a larger degree of habits is needed in order to match the persistence of aggregate consumption in the data. Turning to the labor supply elasticity, the posterior distributions of and 0 (centered around 0:50) show that the data do not convey much information on these parameters. We performed sensitivity analysis with respect to these parameters and found that the main results are not particularly sensitive for a reasonable range of values of and 0 . The estimate of (0:83) implies that prices are reoptimized once every six quarters. However, given the positive indexation coef cient ( D 0:69), prices change every period, although not in response to changes in marginal costs. As for wages, we nd that stickiness in the housing sector ( wh D 0:91) is higher than in the consumption sector ( wc D 0:79), while wage indexation is larger in housing ( wh D 0:40 and wc D 0:08).
Estimates of the monetary policy rule are in line with previous evidence. Finally, all shocks are quite persistent, with autocorrelation coef cients ranging between 0:92 and 0:997.
III. Properties of the Estimated Model
A. Impulse Responses HOUSING PREFERENCE SHOCK. - Figure 2 plots impulse responses to the estimated housing preference shock. We also call this shock a housing demand shock, since it raises both house prices and the returns to housing investment, thus causing the latter to rise. The shock also increases the collateral capacity of constrained agents, thus allowing them to increase borrowing and consumption. Since borrowers have a high marginal propensity to consume, the effects on total consumption are positive, even if consumption of the lenders (not plotted) falls.
An interesting property of the estimated shock is that it generates a long-lasting increase in house prices. The strong persistence of house prices re ect the dynamic process that characterizes the preference shock process, whose estimated autocorrelation is 0:96, rather than the intrinsic dynamics of the house price process which, as the two housing demand equations show, are forward looking (see equations A.2 and A.14 in the Appendix B).
Figure 2 also displays the responses for three alternative versions of the model in which we set p D 0 ( exible prices), wc D wh D 0 ( exible wages) and D 1 (no collateral effects), while holding the remaining parameters at the benchmark values. As the gure illustrates, collateral effects are the key feature of the model that generates a positive and persistent response of consumption following an increase in housing demand. Absent this effect, in fact, an increase in the demand for housing would generate an increase in housing investment and housing prices, but a fall in consumption. Quantitatively, the observed impulse response translates into a rstyear elasticity of consumption to housing prices (conditional on the shock) of around 0:07. This result mirrors the ndings of several papers that document positive effects on consumption from changes in housing wealth (see, for instance, Karl E. Case, John M. Quigley and Robert J. Shiller, 2005, and John Y. Campbell and Joao F. Cocco, 2007) . It is tempting to compare our results with theirs. However, our elasticity is conditional to a particular shock, whereas most microeconometric and time-series studies in the literature try to isolate the elasticity of consumption to housing prices through regressions of consumption on housing wealth, both of which are endogenous variables in our model. We return to this issue in the next section.
Next, we consider the response of residential investment. At the baseline estimates, a shift in housing demand that generates an increase in real house prices of around 1 percent (see Figure  2 ) causes residential investment to rise by around 3:5 percent. As the gure illustrates, sticky wages are crucial here; in particular, the combination of exible housing prices and sticky wages in construction makes residential investment very sensitive to changes in demand conditions. The numbers here can be related to the ndings of Robert H. Topel and Sherwin Rosen (1988) , who estimate an elastic response of new housing supply to changes in prices: for every 1 percent increase in house prices lasting for two years, they nd that new construction rises on impact between 1.5 and 3.15 percent, depending on the speci cations.
Finally, we consider business investment. The impulse response of business investment is the combined effect of two forces: on the one hand, capital in the construction sector k h rises; on the other, there is slow and persistent decline in capital in the consumption sector k c , which occurs since resources are shifted away from one sector to the other. The two effects roughly offset each other, and the overall response of business investment is small. MONETARY SHOCK. - Figure 3 plots an adverse i.i.d. monetary policy shock. Real house prices drop and remain below the baseline for about six quarters. The quantitative effect of the monetary shock on house prices is similar to what is found in VAR studies of the impact of monetary shocks on house prices (see, for instance, Iacoviello, 2005) . All components of aggregate demand fall, with housing investment showing the largest drop, followed by business investment and consumption. The large drop in housing investment is a well-documented fact in VAR studies (e.g. Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler, 1995) . As the gure shows, both nominal rigidities and collateral effects amplify the response of consumption to monetary shocks. Instead, the responses of both types of investment are only marginally affected by the presence of collateral constraints: the reason for this result is, in our opinion, that the model ignores nancing frictions on the side of the rms. In fact, collateral effects slightly reduce the sensitivity of investment to monetary shocks, since unconstrained households shift loanable funds from the constrained households towards rms in order to smooth their consumption. Finally, the negative response of real house prices to monetary shocks instead mainly re ects nominal stickiness.
The response of residential investment is ve times larger than consumption and twice as large as business investment. As Figure 3 shows, wage rigidity is instrumental for this result. Housing investment is interest rate sensitive only when wage rigidity is present. 28 In particular, housing investment falls because housing prices fall relative to wages; housing investment falls a lot because the ow of housing investment is small relative to its stock, so that the drop in investment has to be large to restore the desired stock-ow ratio. Our results support the ndings of Barsky, House and Kimball (2007) and Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst (2006) , who show how models with rigid non-durable prices and exible durable prices may generate a puzzling increase in durables following a negative monetary shock, and that sticky wages can eliminate this puzzle. 29 HOUSING TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER SHOCKS. -Positive technology shocks in the housing sector (plotted in Figure 4 ) lead to a rise in housing investment and, thanks to a fall in construction costs, to a drop in housing prices. As for the responses of aggregate variables to other shocks, our ndings resemble those of estimated DSGE models that do not include a housing sector (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007, and Alejandro Justiniano, Giorgio Primiceri and Andrea Tambalotti, 2009 ). In particular, positive technology shocks in the non-housing sector drive up both housing investment and housing prices; temporary cost-push shocks lead to an increase in in ation and a decline in house prices; persistent shifts in the in ation target persistently move up both in ation and housing prices.
B. Cyclical Properties
Our estimated model explains well the behavior of housing and non-housing variables. As Table 5 shows, most of the model's business cycle statistics lie within the 95 percent probability 28 In robustness experiments we have found that sectoral wage rigidity (rather than overall wage rigidity) matters for this result. That is, sticky wages in the housing sector and exible wages in the non-housing sector are already suf cient to generate a large response of residential investment to monetary shocks. 29 A natural question to ask is the extent to which one can regard construction as a sector featuring strong wage rigidities. There is evidence in this regard. First, construction has higher unionization rates relative to the private sector: 15.4 percent vs. 8.6 percent. Second, several state and federal wage laws in the construction industry insulate movements in wages from movements in the marginal cost of working. The Davis-Bacon Act, for instance, is a federal law mandating a prevailing wage standard in publicly funded construction projects; several states have followed with their own wage legislation, and the provisions of the Davis-Bacon Act also apply to private construction rms. interval computed from the data. 30 The model replicates well the joint behavior of the components of aggregate demand, the cyclicality and volatility of housing prices, and the patterns of comovement between housing and non-housing variables. 31
C. Robustness Analysis
The ability of the model to match volatilities and correlations that are found in the data is, of course, the outcome of having several shocks and frictions. The introduction of a large number of them, while common in the literature on estimated DSGE models, raises the question as to which role each of them plays. Below, we summarize our main ndings. We do so by reporting the main properties of our model shutting off once at the time selected shocks or frictions, and holding all other parameters at their estimated value. 32 30 The statistics are computed using a random selection of 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution and, for each of them, 100 arti cial time series of the main variables of length equal to that of the data, giving a sample of 100,000 series. The business cycle component of each simulated series is extracted using the HP lter (with smoothing parameter set to 1,600). Summary statistics of the posterior distribution of the moments are computed by pooling together all the simulations. GDP denotes domestic demand excluding government purchases and investment, chained 2000 dollars. 31 In our estimated model, the peak correlation of housing investment with other components of aggregate demand (consumption and business investment) is the contemporaneous one. In the data housing investment comoves with consumption but leads business investment by two quarters. Fisher (2007) develops a model that extends the home production framework to make housing complementary to labor and capital in business production; he shows that in such a model housing investment leads business investment. 32 In Appendix D, we report the results of the sensitivity analysis after shutting off shocks and/or frictions and reestimating all the other parameters. The results were qualitatively and quantitatively the same. ARE REAL RIGIDITIES NEEDED?. -A version without adjustment costs exacerbates the relative volatility of investment relative to consumption (the volatility of both types of investment is twice as large as in the data). A version with fully mobile labor and no sector-speci c capital does not help either: it makes housing investment too volatile and generates a strong negative comovement between housing and business investment. Finally, variable capacity utilization improves the properties of the model by generating larger and more persistent responses of consumption and both types of investment to all shocks: when we do not allow for variable utilization, the standard deviation of these variables drops by about 10 to 15 percent.
WHAT DOES LAND DO?. -A nal comment concerns the role of land. In our setup, land works in a way similar to an adjustment cost on housing, since it limits the extent to which the housing stock can be adjusted. In response to shocks, a larger land share reduces the volatility of housing investment and increases the volatility of prices.
ARE THE RESULTS SENSITIVE TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE HOUSE PRICE MEASURES?.
-As a robustness check, we have estimated our model using the OFHEO index as a measure of house prices, and using both the Census and the OFHEO index under the assumption that each of them measures house prices up to some measurement error. Appendix D reports our results in detail. Our main ndings (in terms of parameters estimates, impulse responses and historical decompositions) were qualitatively and quantitatively unaffected. We conjecture that 33 The inability of a model with technology shocks only to explain housing prices and housing investment is in line with the ndings of Davis and Heathcote (2005) . In their model (which is driven technology shocks only), the volatility of housing prices is three times smaller than in the data, and the correlation between house prices and housing investment is negative (it is positive in the data and in our estimated model).
this result occurs because the main differences between the two series stem more from their lowfrequency component than from their cyclical properties: the main difference across parameter estimates is that using the OFHEO series lowers the estimated coef cient on trend growth in housing technology, since the OFHEO series exhibits a stronger upward trend over the sample period.
ARE THE RESULTS SENSITIVE TO THE ASSUMPTION OF HETEROGENEOUS PREFERENCES?.
-In our baseline model, we have allowed habits and labor supply parameters to differ across agents. Appendix D reports the results when we constrain "; and to be the same across patient and impatient agents. The results are essentially unchanged. The model with common preference parameters, if anything, displays a larger response of consumption (and smaller response of housing investment) to a housing preference shock.
IV. Sources and Consequences of Housing Market Fluctuations
Having shown that the estimated model ts the data reasonably well, we use it to address the two questions we raised in the Introduction. First, what are the main driving forces of uctuations in the housing market? Second, can how large are the spillovers from the housing market to the broader economy?
A. What Drives the Housing Market?
TREND MOVEMENTS.. -We nd a faster rate of technological progress in business investment, followed by the consumption sector and, last, by the housing sector. At the posterior median, the long-run quarterly growth rates of consumption, housing investment and real house prices (as implied by the values of the terms and equations 12 to 15) are respectively 0:47, 0:15 and 0:32 percent. In other words, the trend rise in real house prices observed in the data re ects, according to our estimated model, faster technological progress in the non-housing sector. As shown in Figure 5 , our estimated trends t well the secular behavior of consumption, investment and house prices. According to the model, the slow rate of increase of productivity in construction is behind the secular increase in house prices. Our nding is in line with the results of Carol Corrado et al. (2006) , who construct sectoral measures of TFP growth for the U.S.. They also nd that the average TFP growth in the construction sector is negative ( 0:5 percent, annualized) and that increases in the contribution of labor and purchased inputs more than account for real output growth in the sector. 34 What about the role of land? At secular frequencies, land is one of the reasons behind the increase in real house prices, since it acts as a limiting factor in the production of new homes. Quantitatively, however, the contribution of land appears small. Given our estimate of AH and the land share in new homes of 10 percent, the limiting role of land taken alone can account for about 5 percent of the 93 percent increase in real house prices observed in the data. 34 Michael Gort, Greenwood, and Peter Rupert (1999) nd a positive rate of technological progress in structures, but they con ne themselves to non-residential structures such as roads, bridges and skyscrapers.
BUSINESS CYCLE MOVEMENTS.. -Table 6 presents results from the variance decomposition. Together, demand (housing preference) and supply (housing technology) shocks in the housing market explain about one-half of the variance in housing investment and housing prices at business cycle frequencies. The monetary component (the sum of i.i.d. monetary shocks and persistent shifts in the in ation target) explains slightly less, between 15 and 20 percent. The average variance of the forecast error of exogenous shocks in the housing sector to the other components of aggregate demand (consumption and business investment) is instead small. For instance, housing preference shocks explain less than 1 percent of the variance in consumption and business investment. The table reports the posterior median value of the variance of the forecast errors at business cycle frequencies (extracted using the HP lter with smoothing parameter equal to 1,600).
A related question is how the shocks have contributed to the major housing cycles in the U.S.. Figure 6 provides a visual representation and Table 7 provides a numerical summary. The solid line displays the detrended historical data, obtained by subtracting from the raw series the estimated deterministic trends. The other lines show the historical contribution of the three factors under our estimated parameters. As Figure 6 shows, the period 1965-2006 has witnessed two major expansions in real housing prices: the rst from 1976 to 1980, and the second from 1998 to 2005. In the rst cycle, housing prices rose (relative to trend) 17 percent between 1976 and 1980, while residential investment rose by 4:3 percent. Between 1980 and 1985 instead, house prices dropped 13 percent, while residential investment rose by 23 percent. Preference shocks aside, the contribution of technology shocks to the rst housing cycle appears relatively more important than that of monetary policy, especially in ending the housing boom: the technology explanation is also consistent with the observation that, while house prices fell until the end of 1985, residential investment rebounded much more quickly after the 1982 recession. The recent housing price cycle tells a different story. As in the previous cycle, housing preference shocks played an important role in the expansion. Technology shocks are one important factor in the 1998-2005 increase, accounting for about 40 percent of the run-up in prices, whereas monetary conditions explain around 15 percent. Monetary conditions are however more important than technology in ending the boom since 2005: in particular, the monetary policy component accounts for virtually the entire decline of residential investment, and for more than the observed decline in real house prices during the same period.
UNDERSTANDING HOUSING PREFERENCE SHOCKS.. -As we argued above, the housing preference shock might either represent genuine shifts in tastes for housing, or could be nothing else but a catchall for all the unmodeled disturbances that can affect housing demand. We thus ask if our estimated innovations to housing preferences (u j;t ) can survive simple exogeneity tests: to do so, we conduct a standard multivariate analysis of u j and other potential explanatory variables, in the spirit of what Evans (1992) did for technology shocks. We do so by investigating the following speci cation:
where v t is a mean zero, i.i.d. random variable, A .L/ and B .L/ are polynomials in the lag operator L, and x is a list of potential explanatory variables for housing demand. If the "true" model of the economy is our DSGE model, no variable should Granger cause the innovations to housing preferences. A more mundane interpretation is that the shock could capture shifters of housing demand that are not explicitly included in our stylized model. The question is: what are these shifters, and do they affect housing demand in an economically reasonable way?
The typical determinants of housing demand that the literature has looked at include the number of potential housing consumers, their nancial resources and tastes, and measures of the user cost of housing that account for deductability of mortgage interest payment. Some of these determinants have already been included in our model. We follow a exible approach and include numerous controls in the list of regressors. These regressors are: Initial Fees and Charges for a Mortgage (I F AC, measured in percent of the loan); Civilian Labor Force (C L F); Household leverage (L E V , constructed as the ratio of outstanding home mortgages to holdings of residential real estate); the University of Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment (C S); the share of population between ages 25 and 39 (P O P2539); 35 the share of subprime mortgages in total mortgage originations (SU B P R I M E). 36 In addition, we also add as additional controls in ation (I N F L ; constructed as in Section II) and the real after-tax mortgage rate (RT AX ). If in ation illusion matters for house prices, one should expect an effect of in ation on house prices over and above the conventional effects of in ation on housing demand that our DSGE model should capture. The real after-tax mortgage rate is constructed as 0:7R M I N F L ; where R M is the 30-Year Conventional Mortgage Rate and the tax rate is set at 30 percent: if deductability of mortgage payments matters, R M should have an effect on housing demand over and above the effect of real interest rates. 37 In our baseline speci cation we enter all variables, except I N F L, in rst differences (one lag was suf cient to obtain i.i.d. residuals). Table 8 presents our results. Some of the variables in the regressions are signi cant and have the expected sign, although their combined explanatory power is low: the R-squared is about 15 percent. Our preferred speci cation keeps only the 35 We convert the original annual series into a quarterly series assuming that the underlying series follows an ARIMA(1,1,0) process with autoregressive coef cient equal to 0.99. 36 The subprime market was virtually non-existent prior to 1995. 
One lag of u j;t and x t were chosen.
variables that are signi cant at the 10 percent level in the initial regression: the preference shock depends negatively on initial fees and charges (low initial fees might lure people into buying more housing than otherwise needed); it depends negatively on in ation (thus going against the idea that higher in ation spurs housing demand over and above the effect that in ation has on economic activity); it depends positively on the share of population in the 25-39 years-old range; and it depends positively on the share of subprime mortgages. 38 Figure 7 plots actual and tted values from our preferred regression. Overall, the results provide some evidence that some of the model's omitted variables capture part of the preference shock. For instance, the rise and the fall in the subprime mortgage market of the 2003-2006 period accounts for a good chunk of the positive housing demand shocks of the same period. However, from a quantitative standpoint, house prices movements at business cycle frequencies cannot be always attributed to changes in observables, even after accounting for a large set of candidates (probably larger than the possible stories that a stylized model can capture We now quantify the spillovers from housing to the broader economy. We do so in two steps. First, we show how our model is consistent with the idea that the conventional wealth effect on consumption is stronger when collateral effects are present, and offers an easy way to measure the additional strength that collateral effects provide. Second, we provide in-sample estimates of the historical role played by collateral effects in affecting U.S. consumption dynamics.
THE HOUSING WEALTH EFFECT.. -As we explained above, a large part of the model spillovers occur through the effects that uctuations in housing prices have on consumption; these effects are reinforced by the degree of nancial frictions, as measured by the wage share of credit constrained agents and by the loan-to-value ratio. To measure the spillovers, we run a basic regression that allows for changes in housing wealth to affect aggregate consumption: this equation can be interpreted as a reduced-form way of capturing the direct and indirect effects that uctuations in housing wealth have on aggregate consumption, although both variables are endogenous in our model. In the simulated output of our model, regressing consumption growth on lagged growth in housing wealth yields (standard errors are in parenthesis) Speci cations of this kind have a long tradition in macroeconometric models, and our measured housing wealth effect from the data and the baseline model is in the ballpark of existing 39 As a further check, we have reestimated the model allowing for random shocks in the loan-to-value ratio m, using as an additional observable the observed ratio of oustanding home mortgages over residential real estate holdings. Appendix D reports additional details. We have found that "credit shocks" have quantitatively little impact for the volatility on the model dynamics: most of the effects of credit shocks are redistributive, and their estimated effect on aggregate prices and quantities appears limited. 40 The model variables have been generated using the posterior median of the parameters and drawing shocks from their distribution. 1,000 samples of observations of length equal to the data were generated: the numbers in the text are averages across all regressions. We experimented with speci cations including lagged income, non-housing wealth and interest rates as controls. These variables turned out to be insigni cant. 41 The housing wealth series is from the Flow of Funds (Balance sheet of households and non-pro t organizations:
B.100, row 4), and measures the market value of household real estate wealth (code FL155035015). The series is de ated with the nonfarm business sector de ator and normalized by civilian noninstitutional population.
estimates (see the survey by Poterba, 2000) . Needless to say, the positive number above captures, in the model as in the data, the in uence of common macroeconomic factors as well as the direct effect of changes in housing wealth on consumption through the collateral channel. However, an important advantage of our model relative to the data-based regressions is that the model allows disentangling the two effects. To do so, we run the same regression using the simulated model output in the absence of collateral effects (that is, setting D 1 ). This regression yields a smaller coef cient on housing wealth, equal to 0:108. The comparison between the estimates with and without collateral effects offers a way to measure the spillovers from the housing market to consumption that work through the direct collateral effect. In practice, it suggests that collateral effects increase the elasticity of consumption to housing wealth by 2.5 percentage points (from 0:108 to 0:133). 42 Is this effect large or small? Obviously, our equation is misspeci ed relative to the structural equilibrium relationships implied by our model: the correct relationship between consumption and housing wealth is part of the equilibrium law of motion of the model which takes the form of a vector autoregressive moving average process incorporating all the endogenous variables of the model. However, our model is consistent with the idea that the so-called wealth effect on consumption increases with the fraction of households who use their home as collateral. 43 The other takeaway is that, even without collateral constraints, our model generates a positive comovement between changes in housing wealth and changes in future consumption. This comovement reects the result that most of our identi ed shocks generate a positive correlation between housing wealth and consumption. When collateral effects are present, however, such correlation becomes larger. We can express the above elasticity of as the product of the correlation between 1C t and 1H W t 1 , say ; times the ratio of their standard deviations, 1C = 1H W . Collateral effects increase the elasticity because they reinforce the correlation between the two variables (when goes from 1 to 0:79; the corresponding value of rises from 0:19 to 0:23), while they affect little the volatility of consumption growth and housing wealth growth. SUBSAMPLE ESTIMATES: FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND THE HISTORICAL CONTRIBU-TION OF COLLATERAL EFFECTS.. -In our baseline estimates, we have kept the assumption that the structural parameters were constant throughout the sample. However, several market innovations following the nancial reforms of the early 1980s affected the housing market. Jeffrey Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) , for instance, argue that mortgage market liberalization drastically reduced the equity requirements associated with collateralized borrowing. More in general, several developments in the credit market might have enhanced the ability to households to borrow, thus reducing the fraction of credit constrained households, as pointed out by Karen E. Dynan, Douglas W. Elmendorf, and Daniel Sichel (2006) . Motivated by this evidence, we estimate our model across two subperiods, and use our estimates to measure the feedback from housing 42 When we condition on housing preference shocks only, the analogous regression coef cient is 0:028 when equals its estimated value of 0:79; and falls to 0:011 when is set equal to 1.
43 Bernanke (2007) argues that changes in home values may affect household borrowing and spending by more than suggested by the conventional wealth effect because changes in homeowners' net worth affect their external nance premiums and costs of credit. In our model, changes in home values affect the availability rather than the cost of credit, but the same intuition carries over. market uctuations to consumer spending. Following Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) , we set a "low" loan-to-value ratio in the rst subperiod and a "high" loan-to-value ratio in the second subperiod in order to model nancial liberalization in our setup. Namely, we set m D 0:775 in the period 1965:I-1982:IV and m D 0:925 in the period 1989:I-2006:IV. 44 As we mentioned earlier, high loan-to-value ratios potentially amplify the response of consumption to given "demand" side disturbances; however, we remain agnostic about the overall importance of collateral effects, by estimating two different values of (as well as all other parameters) for the two subsamples. Table 9 compares the model estimates for the two subperiods. The late period captures the high nancial liberalization period. Most structural parameters do not differ across subperiods, with the exception of the volatility of most of the shocks, that falls in the second period. We 44 The rst period ends in 1982:IV, in line with evidence dating the beginning of nancial liberalization with the GarnSt.Germain Act of 1982, which deregulated the savings and loan industry. The second period starts in 1989:I; this way, we have two samples of equal length and we allow for a transition phase between regimes. nd a lower value for in the rst period (0.68) compared to the second (0.81). However, the smaller share of credit-constrained agents is more than offset by the larger loan-to-value ratio. As shown by Figure 8 , consumption responds more to a given size preference shock in the second period (a similar result holds when comparing monetary shocks). Hence the estimates suggest that nancial innovation has reduced the fraction of credit-constrained people but, at the same time, has increased their sensitivity to given changes in economic conditions.
Using the subsample estimates, we calculate the counterfactual consumption path in the absence of collateral constraints ( D 1), and subtract it from actual consumption to measure the contribution of collateral constraints to U.S. consumption dynamics. Figure 9 presents our results. In the early period, the contribution of collateral effects to consumption uctuations accounts for 6 percent of the total variance 45 of year-on-year consumption growth. In the late period, instead, collateral effects account for a larger share, explaining 12 percent of the total variance in consumption growth.
V. Concluding Remarks
Our estimated model explains several features of the data. At cyclical frequencies, it matches the observation that both housing prices and housing investment are strongly procyclical, volatile, and sensitive to monetary shocks. Over longer horizons, the model explains the prolonged rise in real house prices over the last four decades and attributes this increase to slower technological progress in the housing sector, and to the presence of land (a xed factor) in the production function for new homes. We have used the model to address two important questions. First, what shocks drive the housing market at business cycle frequency? Our answer is that housing demand shocks and housing technology shocks account for roughly one-quarter each of the cyclical volatility of housing investment and housing prices. Monetary factors account for slightly less, but have played a larger role in the housing market cycle at the turn of the 21st century. Second, do uctuations in the housing market propagate to other forms of expenditure? Our answer is that the spillovers from the housing market to the broader economy are non-negligible, concentrated on consumption rather than business investment, and have become more important over time, to the extent that nancial innovation has increased the marginal availability of funds for credit-constrained agents.
Another message of this paper is that a good part of the uctuations in housing prices observed in the data are viewed by the model as the outcome of "exogenous" shifts to housing demand. This result holds after regressing our estimated innovations to housing preferences against a large set of potential explanatory variables for housing demand that we have not explicitly incorporated in our model. As with every shock, the issue of whether preference shocks are spontaneous, primitive and interpretable remains an open one: we have conducted a search of newspapers' articles for the period 1965-2006 trying to relate, from an informal standpoint, our estimated shocks to stories about the national housing market. 46 Press articles often explain movements in the housing market with changes in housing demand that they could not immediately attribute to changes in fundamentals such as in ation, incomes and interest rates. To give a few examples, they refer to shifts in the housing market as coming from the "increased needs for privacy", to "changes in tastes", to the "desire to buy more housing than necessary", to "faith in real estate as an investment". Obviously, these explanations are only meant to be suggestive. It goes without saying that digging more in detail into the structural determinants of these shocks is an important topic for future research. Note: The standard error of the preference shock in the second period is normalized so that the shock affect house prices by the same amount in the impact period. The y-axis measures percent deviation from the steady state. Note: The contribution of collateral effects is calculated subtracting from actual consumption growth the path of simulated consumption growth that obtains when we feed in the model the smoothed estimates of the shocks and shut off collateral effects ( D 1 and m D 0). Shaded areas indicate recessions as determined by the NBER.
